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ICRICT LOOKING TO A FUTURE OF ACTUAL TAX REFORM: 
AN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS OF THE INDEPENDENT 
COMMISSION FOR THE REFORM OF INTERNATIONAL 
CORPORATE TAXATION 
Brendan C. Chisholm* 
“As we peer into society’s future, we—you and I, and our government—
must avoid the impulse to live only for today, plundering for our own 
ease and convenience the precious resources of tomorrow.  We cannot 
mortgage the material assets of our grandchildren without risking the 
loss also of their political and spiritual heritage.  We want democracy to 
survive for all generations to come, not to become the insolvent phantom 
of tomorrow.” – Dwight D. Eisenhower, Farewell Address1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
It is often said that there are only two certainties in life: death and 
taxes.  But for international corporations, this axiom is simply 
inaccurate; death may yet prove unavoidable, but taxes—especially in 
today’s corporate world—are optional. 
In an era of rapid globalization, national and regional economies are 
increasingly convoluted due to the spread of multinational corporations 
and their growing political influence.2  Likewise, corporations are 
growing more complex, with subsidiaries and branches stretching all 
over the world.3  As corporations grow and spread across international 
boundaries, concerns regarding tax efficiency arise.4  On one hand, 
double taxation, when corporations are taxed on the same revenue by 
multiple nations, is a problem for corporations because it causes 
corporations to limit profitability by over-paying on taxes.5  On the 
other, double non-taxation and under-taxation are problems that 
governments hope to avoid because these result in shortfall in potential 
          * Associate Member, 2015-2016 University of Cincinnati Law Review. 
 1. President Dwight D. Eisenhower, Farewell Radio and Television Address to the American 
People (Jan. 17, 1961), 
https://www.eisenhower.archives.gov/all_about_ike/speeches/farewell_address.pdf. 
 2. See, e.g., Anup Shah, The Rise of Corporations, GLOBAL ISSUES (Dec. 5, 2002), 
http://www.globalissues.org/article/234/the-rise-of-corporations. 
 3. Id. 
 4. See James R. Hines Jr. & Lawrence H. Summers, How Globalization Affects Tax Design, 23 
TAX POL’Y & ECON. 123 (2009). 
 5. See Double Taxation, INVESTOPEDIA, 
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/d/double_taxation.asp (last visited Feb. 13, 2017). 
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tax revenue.6  In both cases, the primary concern is efficiency: countries 
do not want to leave money on the table,7 and, generally speaking, 
corporations try not to pay more than the minimum taxes they owe.8  
Frequently, however, concerns about violating sovereign rights force 
nations to tread carefully when writing tax policy, which leaves the door 
open for corporations to exploit inevitable loopholes in a complex tax 
system.9  This is where the international tax system comes into play—to 
alleviate these problems by striking the right balance between two 
extremes. 
This Article aims to analyze a new organization devoted to tax 
reform: the Independent Commission on the Reform of International 
Corporate Taxation (ICRICT).  To do so, Part II discusses the current 
international-corporate-tax climate and identifies common issues and 
practices that either contribute to or alleviate problems in international-
corporate tax.  Part III introduces a different organization: the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), a 
group consisting of thirty-five nations with the most prosperous 
economies and prominent social impact around the globe that works to 
“foster prosperity and fight poverty through economic growth and 
stability.”10  This part further analyzes the OECD’s Action Plan on Base 
Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS), which is widely accepted by the 
international community as a substantial step towards a more efficient 
and fair tax system.  Discussion of the OECD is necessary to understand 
the current tax climate and the steps that are being taken by ICRICT.  
 6. “Many governments have to cope with less revenue and a higher cost to ensure compliance.  
Moreover, Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) undermines the integrity of the tax system, as the 
public, the media and some taxpayers deem reported low corporate taxes to be unfair. . . .  Overall 
resource allocation, affected by tax-motivated behaviour, is not optimal.”  ORG. FOR ECON. 
COOPERATION & DEV., ACTION PLAN ON BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING 8 (2013), 
https://www.oecd.org/ctp/BEPSActionPlan.pdf [hereinafter ACTION PLAN]. 
 7. Postlewaite and Donaldson describe this concern in the context of a U.S. corporation that 
uses artificial entities to shield its tax obligations: “If income or expense is shifted to or from a foreign 
person typically immune from United States taxation, the federal coffers face a permanent leakage of 
domestic tax on the business activities of that enterprise.” 1 PHILIP F. POSTLEWAITE &  SAMUEL A. 
DONALDSON, INTERNATIONAL TAXATION: CORPORATE AND INDIVIDUAL 366 (4th ed. 2003). 
 8. See Tax Strategy and Corporate Reputation: A Business Issue, PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS 
(2013), (https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/tax/publications/assets/pwc-tax-strategy-and-corporate-reputation-
a-tax-issue-a-business-issue.pdf. 
 9. See ACTION PLAN, supra note 6, at 10.  See also 26 C.F.R. § 1.482-1(a)(1) (2016), for the 
stated purpose of the United States Government’s response to tax evasion by multinational corporations 
who rightfully owe U.S. taxes: “The purpose of section 482 is to ensure that taxpayers clearly reflect 
income attributable to controlled transactions and to prevent the avoidance of taxes with respect to such 
transactions.  Section 482 places a controlled taxpayer on a tax parity with an uncontrolled taxpayer by 
determining the true taxable income of the controlled taxpayer.”  This task of “determining the true 
taxable income” is difficult, and will be the subject of later discussion. 
 10. What We Do and How, ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., 
http://www.oecd.org/about/whatwedoandhow (last visited Feb. 14, 2016). 
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Next, Part IV delves into ICRICT, its mission and makeup, as well as 
the issues it tackles.  More specifically, this part answers the following 
question: What does ICRICT do that is different from well-established 
reform movements such as BEPS?  Finally, Part V concludes that 
ICRICT has a real opportunity to bring on a new future in tax reform 
that goes beyond a broken status quo that the OECD merely shifted 
around. 
II. CURRENT INTERNATIONAL TAX PRACTICES 
In a 2013 report, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) found that 
there are two primary issues in international taxation: legal tax 
avoidance by multinational corporations and illegal tax evasion by 
wealthy individuals.11  In its introduction, the IMF described how tax 
avoidance practices are self-perpetuating, often because corporations 
utilize the very measures nations enact to counter tax avoidance:  
 
The overarching problem, however, is in each case the 
fundamental difficulty that national tax policies create cross-
country spillovers.  The opportunities for avoidance and evasion 
that are now such a concern are a very visible manifestation of 
such spillovers: they exploit gaps and inconsistencies in the 
international tax framework that arise from combining national tax 
systems . . . . These can arise instead in the less visible but perhaps 
even more damaging form of either a dislocation of economic 
activity purely to exploit differences in national tax policies or an 
overall level of taxation below that which would be chosen if 
countries took full account of how each is affected by the others’ 
policies.12 
 
In other words, many nations jointly agree that tax avoidance is a 
problem, but have only severally addressed the problem.  As a result, 
differences in codes and limited transparency between nations give 
corporations room to exploit inevitable loopholes.  The 2013 IMF report 
implies, by identifying a “less visible” form of tax abuse, that the lack of 
transparency between nations is a major contributor to tax abuse; the 
scholarly community has seen this for even longer.13 
 11. IMF, Issues in International Taxation and the Role of the IMF, Executive Summary (June 
28, 2013). 
 12. Id. at 3–4. 
 13. See Diane Ring, Protecting the Tax Base of Developing Countries: Transparency and 
Disclosure (U.N.  Dep’t of Econ. & Soc. Affairs, May 2013), 
http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/tax/2014TBP2/Paper_TransparencyDisclosure.pdf, for an overview of new 
 
3
Chisholm: ICRICT Looking to a Future of Actual Tax Reform
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2018
234 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [VOL. 85 
New data illustrates the extent to which many major corporations 
avoid paying their full taxes.  In October 2015, Citizens for Tax Justice 
released a report on Fortune 500 companies’ use of offshore tax havens 
to avoid paying their full share of taxes in the United States.14  The 
report found that, as of 2014,15 358 of the Fortune 500 companies 
disclose offshore subsidiaries in tax havens, thereby dodging the vast 
majority of their tax obligations at home.16  The most prolific subsidiary 
holdings belonged to Apple, who reported $181.1 billion offshore in 
three subsidiaries incorporated in Ireland.17  This is only the beginning 
of the story, however, as two of these subsidiaries are tax residents of 
neither the U.S. nor Ireland, which allows Apple to pay zero tax to any 
government on the majority of their offshore profits.18 
The rest of this introduction discusses several of the main tax abuse 
practices, and concludes with a brief look into how the international 
community has responded to notable cases. 
A. Base Erosion 
One common issue in international-corporate taxation is the problem 
of base erosion, which essentially is when nations are unable to fully tax 
the economic activity that happens within their borders.  The OECD 
describes a general base erosion problem as follows:  
 
If you upload a video, does the site add the same value if 10 people 
watch it or 1 million?  And if the site uses your video to attract 
advertisers, is the ad money made in your country, the countries 
where the video is seen, the country where the computer storing it 
is kept, or none of these?19 
 
developments in transparency and disclosure in taxation issues, as well as existing methods for 
obtaining such information. 
 14. ROBERT S. MCINTYRE, RICHARD PHILLIPS, & PHINEAS BAXANDALL, CITIZENS FOR TAX 
JUSTICE, OFFSHORE SHELL GAMES (Oct. 2015), 
http://ctj.org/ctjreports/2015/10/offshore_shell_games_2015.php#.VsD1QZMrJE4 [hereinafter 
OFFSHORE SHELL GAMES]. 
 15. The report used data from 2007 fiscal year SEC filings that was presented in 2008 in the 
findings of the Government Accountability Office.  See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, 
INTERNATIONAL TAXATION: LARGE U.S. CORPORATIONS AND FEDERAL CONTRACTORS WITH 
SUBSIDIARIES IN JURISDICTIONS LISTED AS TAX HAVENS OR FINANCIAL PRIVACY JURISDICTIONS (Dec. 
2008), http://www.gao.gov/assets/290/284522.pdf. 
 16. OFFSHORE SHELL GAMES, supra note 14, at 20. 
 17. Id. at 23. 
 18. Id. at 2. 
 19. Patrick Love, What is BEPS and How Can You Stop It?, OECD INSIGHTS (July 19, 2013) 
http://oecdinsights.org/2013/07/19/what-is-beps-how-can-you-stop-it/. 
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This problem succinctly illustrates the difficulties nations have when 
determining the appropriate tax amount on intangible goods.  It also 
shows how there is clear opportunity for corporations to manipulate 
these prices themselves, a strategy called transfer pricing, which will be 
discussed in the next section.  While it causes problems for tax systems 
all over the world, the practice of keeping earnings on intangible assets 
ambiguous is not per se illegal.20  Instead, corporations merely take 
advantage of obsolete tax systems that were created in a time before 
technology and globalization had reached current levels.21 
B. Profit Shifting 
The three most common methods of profit shifting are through hybrid 
mismatches, special purpose entities, and transfer pricing.  Hybrid 
mismatches are the result of corporations having “hybrid entities”22 that 
take advantage of more lenient tax systems in one country while 
avoiding more stringent regulation in another.  Generally speaking, 
corporations use hybrids to try to have a transaction treated differently 
by two or more of the nations that are involved—for instance, calling 
the same transaction debt or equity for accounting purposes to take 
advantage of different national tax systems.23 
A second method for profit shifting is through the use of a special 
purpose entity (SPE).  SPEs are entities commonly found to possess four 
aspects: (i) no or few employees; (ii) little or no physical presence in the 
host economy; (iii) assets and liabilities that represent investments in or 
from other countries; and (iv) core business that consists of group 
financing or holding activities.24  Other common names for SPEs 
include financing subsidiaries, conduits, holding companies, shell 
companies, shelf companies, and brass-plate companies.25  SPEs 
contribute to the economies of their resident nations by serving as 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. In their treatise on international taxation, Postlewaite and Donaldson describe the two types 
of hybrid entities: “The ‘regular hybrid entity’ arises where the entity is treated as fiscally transparent in 
the country of source but as a nontransparent enterprise in the country of residence. . . .  In the converse 
setting, i.e., where the enterprise is treated as nontransparent in the country of source but as transparent 
in the country of residence—the enterprise is appropriately referenced as a ‘reverse hybrid entity.’”  2 
POSTLEWAITE & DONALDSON, supra note 7, at 339. 
 23. Patrick Love, BEPS: Why You’re Taxed More Than a Multinational, OECD INSIGHTS (Feb. 
13, 2013) http://oecdinsights.org/2013/02/13/beps-why-youre-taxed-more-than-a-multinational/. 
 24. See ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., BENCHMARK DEFINITION OF FOREIGN DIRECT 
INVESTMENT, 99–108 (4th ed. 2008), 
https://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investmentstatisticsandanalysis/40193734.pdf, for an expanded definition 
of an SPE. 
 25. Id. at 100. 
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targets of direct investment, which are then taxable by the resident 
nation.26  These SPEs, however, are not always taxed by their home 
countries, as illustrated by the Apple example discussed earlier.  Recall 
that Apple uses two subsidiaries that are residents of neither the United 
States nor Ireland.  These subsidiaries are classic examples of SPEs, and 
illustrate their potential as vehicles for tax avoidance. 
Manipulating transfer pricing is another common—albeit a far more 
nuanced and complex—method for profit shifting.  Transfer prices are 
what companies pay to move goods or services between their own 
subsidiaries and other corporations.27  The abuse occurs when the 
company is allowed to set its own prices for these transfers.  A widely 
accepted method of addressing this manipulation is the “arm’s-length 
standard,” which seeks to “reflect the economic results that would have 
been derived from that transaction had it occurred between unrelated 
persons.”28  Essentially, the transaction between corporation and 
subsidiary is being treated as if it had occurred between two unrelated 
entities.  This task of addressing this manipulation, however, grows 
more complex when attempting to value intangible assets such as 
intellectual property and other high value-added services.29  As a result, 
corporations are able to easily manipulate the values and sources of 
intangible assets to attain the most favorable tax atmosphere. 
C. Double Taxation 
Multinational corporations are subject to taxation in both the country 
where they are organized and the countries where they derive their 
income.30  If the corporation were subject to the full tax rate of both 
jurisdictions, the corporation would pay excessive taxes and 
consequently, would be left with a narrower profit margin.  In their 
 26. See Coordinated Direct Investment Survey (CDIS), IMF, http://data.imf.org/?sk=40313609-
F037-48C1-84B1-E1F1CE54D6D5&sId=1390030109571(last updated Dec. 12, 2016), for an 
interactive presentation of data on the amount of money invested (largely through SPEs) as Foreign 
Direct Investments in nations around the world.  Topping the list is the Netherlands, where $4.3 trillion 
was invested in 2013 as Inward Direct Investment.  The Netherlands also invested the most money in 
2013 in other countries through Outward Direct Investment, totaling over $5.2 trillion. 
 27. Patrick Love, Price Fixing, OECD INSIGHTS (Mar. 16, 2012) 
http://oecdinsights.org/2012/03/26/price-fixing/. 
 28. 1 POSTLEWAITE & DONALDSON, supra note 7, at 368.  See Article 9 of the MODEL 
CONVENTION WITH RESPECT TO TAXES ON INCOME AND CAPITAL , ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & 
DEV. 23–30 (2014), http://www.oecd.org/tax/treaties/2014-model-tax-convention-articles.pdf, for the 
OECD’s official description of the arm’s-length standard. 
 29. See Prem Sikka, Shifting profits across borders, GUARDIAN (Feb. 12, 2009), 
www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2009/feb/11/taxavoidance-tax. 
 30. Briefing Book: Key Elements of the U.S. Tax System, TAX POLICY CENTER, 
http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/how-does-current-system-international-taxation-work 
(last visited Mar. 14, 2017). 
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treatise on international taxation, Postlewaite and Donaldson illustrate 
how this simple concept can have a serious impact with a simple 
scenario known as “double taxation”: 
 
Thus, a United States individual or corporation earning $500 in 
Germany may be taxed both by Germany (assuming a 40 percent 
rate yielding a $200 tax) and the United States (assuming a 35 
percent rate yielding a $175 tax).  Without relief from one or both 
of the jurisdictions, the tax bill on the $500 of income would thus 
be $375, imposing upon the taxpayer an effective tax rate of 75 
percent.31 
 
In the real world, however, corporations oftentimes earn profits in 
dozens of other countries, which could subject them to the tax rate of 
each country they generate revenue in.32 
As a result, nations work together to limit the potential negative effect 
such a harsh tax rate would have on international-corporate activity.  
There are two primary methods of limiting harsh double-taxation: tax 
treaties and foreign tax credits.  Under tax treaties, “residents (not 
necessarily citizens) of foreign countries are taxed at a reduced rate, or 
are exempt from . . . income taxes of certain items of income they 
receive from sources within [a given country].”33  The hope is that these 
tax treaties will eliminate any potential for double-taxation by 
signatories.  The other U.S. method of mitigating potential double 
taxation is the foreign tax credit, which is a purely domestic method of 
addressing double taxation.  The IRS describes this tax credit as follows: 
“If you paid or accrued foreign taxes to a foreign country on foreign 
source income and are subject to U.S. tax on the same income, you may 
be able to take either a credit or an itemized deduction for those 
taxes.”34 
 31. 1 POSTLEWAITE & DONALDSON, supra note 7, at 148. 
 32. Double taxation of corporate income tax may also occur at other levels, including at the 
individual level through income tax on dividends and capital gains, but these are not the focus of this 
Article.  See Kyle Pomerleau, Eliminating Double Taxation through Corporate Integration, TAX 
FOUND. (Feb. 23, 2015), http://www.taxfoundation.org/article/eliminating-double-taxation-through-
corporate-integration, for an argument that this second form of double taxation may be eliminated by 
merging corporate and individual income tax as corporate earnings in the U.S. Tax Code. 
 33. Tax Treaties, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/individuals/international-taxpayers/tax-treaties (last 
updated Jan. 20, 2017). 
 34. Foreign Tax Credit, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/Individuals/International-Taxpayers/Foreign-
Tax-Credit (last updated Dec. 16, 2017). 
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D. Recent Remedies 
Despite the complexity of any attempt to simultaneously tackle all of 
these intertwined issues, countries and organizations have gotten better 
at identifying notable tax avoidance practices and have responded by 
more aggressively pursuing these corporations to recover lost tax 
revenue.  This past year, in the wake of a massive tax evasion scandal in 
Luxembourg, the European Commission (the executive of the European 
Union) issued judgments against large corporations like Starbucks 
Corporation and Fiat Chrysler, while continuing an in-depth probe into 
the relationship between Apple and the Irish government for evidence of 
official misconduct.35 
As part of its process, the European Commission begins by 
distributing an official communication of findings through which the 
Commission justifies pursuing official action.  These communications 
provide insight into the European Commission’s evaluation process.  
The documents clearly establish the methods of discovery, the corporate 
structures of Starbucks and Fiat Chrysler, as well as the negotiated tax 
relationships that each of these two companies have established with 
Holland and Luxembourg, respectively.36  On October 21, 2015, the 
European Commission issued a press release that contained its findings: 
the “selective tax advantages” that were given to Starbucks and Fiat 
Chrysler by the Netherlands and Luxembourg were in violation of the 
officially legislated European Union rules on state aid that govern all 
member nations.37 
EU officials indicate that these decisions are likely only the beginning 
of a new, more aggressive tax rules-enforcement policy.  EU 
Commissioner for Competition Margrethe Vestager said in a statement 
on the European Commission’s findings:  
 
Tax rulings that artificially reduce a company’s tax burden are not 
in line with EU state aid rules.  They are illegal.  I hope that, with 
today’s decisions, this message will be heard by member state 
governments and companies alike.  All companies, big or small, 
 35. Stephanie Bodoni & Gaspard Sebag, Starbucks, Fiat Told to Repay Tax as EU Sets Up Apple 
Clash, BLOOMBERG TECH. (Oct. 21, 2015), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-10-
21/starbucks-fiat-first-in-firing-line-as-eu-orders-tax-repayments-ig0kk625. 
 36. See Alleged Aid to Starbucks 2014 O.J. (C 460) 11; Invitation to Submit Comments Pursuant 
to Article 108(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 2014  O.J. (C 369) 11. 
 37. European Commission Press Release IP/15/5880, Commission Decides Selective Tax 
Advantages for Fiat in Luxembourg and Starbucks in the Netherlands Are Illegal Under EU State Aid 
Rules (Oct. 21, 2015).  Bloomberg reports that the two corporations could be responsible for as much as 
€30 million in back taxes and that they must immediately cease the illegal tax practices.  Bodoni & 
Sebag, supra note 35.  
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multinational or not, should pay their fair share of tax.38 
 
A recent report from the Irish Independent further signals a continuation 
of this policy.  In September 2015, the Irish newspaper announced the 
European Commission’s intention to find against Ireland for giving what 
amounted to state aid to Apple through transfer pricing schemes.39  The 
report suggested that the back taxes Apple would owe could total as 
much as $19 billion,40 an amount which Apple itself—expressing 
concern—has said is “material.”41 
While these recent moves have certainly caused a splash, they are 
undoubtedly only the tip of the iceberg of harmful tax practices.  EU 
Commissioner for Competition Vestager recently promised, “We do not 
stop here.  We [will] continue the inquiries into tax rulings in all EU 
member states.”42  Transparency and an equal commitment from the rest 
of the international community will be essential for future progress in 
these matters. 
III. OECD’S MOVEMENT AGAINST BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING 
The first official concerted effort to address international tax 
problems came from the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD).  Established on September 30, 1961, the OECD 
describes itself as “a unique forum where governments work together to 
address the economic, social and environmental challenges of 
globalization.”43  In its 50th Anniversary Vision Statement, the OECD 
reestablished its original vision and announced its position as a policy 
network that is determined “to help countries develop policies together 
to promote economic growth and healthy labour markets, boost 
investment and trade, support sustainable development, raise living 
standards, and improve the functioning of markets.”44  In 2013, the 
OECD, in concert with the G20, promulgated its Action Plan on Base 
Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS), of which the primary goal is to 
provide “domestic and international instruments that will better align 
 38. Bodoni & Sebag, supra note 35. 
 39. European Commission to Find Against Ireland in Apple Tax Probe – Reports, IRISH INDEP. 
(Sept. 4, 2015), http://www.independent.ie/business/irish/european-commission-to-find-against-ireland-
in-apple-tax-probe-reports-31503070.html. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Bodoni & Sebag, supra note 35. 
 42. Id. 
 43. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), ORG. FOR ECON. 
COOPERATION & DEV., http://www.oecd.org/about/ (last visited Feb. 14, 2017). 
 44. OECD 50th Anniversary Vision Statement, ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV. (May 26, 
2011), http://www.oecd.org/mcm/48064973.pdf.  
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rights to tax with economic activity.”45  This section introduces the 
OECD by describing its makeup and functions and then looks at the 
BEPS initiative. 
The OECD was born out of an earlier organization called the 
Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC).46  The 
primary purpose of this earlier organization was to administer the funds 
the United States gave to Western Europe in the Marshall Plan by 
ensuring cooperation between nations and establishing policies that 
facilitated greater cross-border trade.47  In time, the Marshall Plan and 
OEEC were deemed successful, but increased opportunity for inter-
European trade created unprecedented interdependence and the need to 
formally include other nations.48  Thus, with the addition of the United 
States and Canada, the OECD was born in 1961.49 
While the focus of this Article is on the BEPS initiative that was 
created in 2013, the OECD also has several subcommittees that have 
specific roles in achieving the overall goal of the Organisation.50  The 
Organisation is headed by a Secretary General, a position currently held 
by Mexican economist Angel Gurría,51 who oversees an Executive 
Committee in charge of the many subcommittees, as well as an 
International Secretariat that oversees the “efficient administration of the 
Organisation.”52  Today, there are thirty-five Member nations and over 
one hundred developing economies who work together to promote the 
economic and social well-being of people around the world.53 
 45. ACTION PLAN, supra note 6, at 11. 
 46. History, ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., http://www.oecd.org/about/history/ (last 
visited Feb. 14, 2017). 
 47. ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., OECD: HISTORY, AIMS, STRUCTURE 5 (1972), 
http://oac.cdlib.org/ark:/28722/bk0003z6f8w/?brand=oac4 [hereinafter OECD: HISTORY, AIMS, 
STRUCTURE]. 
 48. Id.  The OECD discusses the international social and economic condition at the time of its 
emergence as providing a perfect opportunity for different and even more coordinated international 
effort: “[I]t was becoming increasingly the case that the policies of any individual country had a direct 
and unavoidable influence for good or bad on economic conditions in every other country.  This 
increased interdependence of the industrialised countries made it logical to plan for an Organisation in 
which the North American countries would participate on an equal footing.”  Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. The formal statement of aims read as follows: “(a) the highest sustainable economic growth 
and employment and a rising standard of living in Member countries, while maintaining financial 
stability, and thus to contribute to the development of the world economy; (b) to contribute to sound 
economic expansion in Member as well as non-member countries in the process of economic 
development; and (c) to contribute to the expansion of world trade on a multilateral, non-discriminatory 
basis in accordance with international obligations.”  Id. at 13. 
 51. Secretary-General, ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., 
http://www.oecd.org/about/secretary-general/ (last visited Mar. 14, 2017). 
 52. OECD: HISTORY, AIMS, STRUCTURE, supra note 47, at 35.  See also id. at 39 for a graphic 
depiction of the OECD’s structure. 
 53. Members and Partners, ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., 
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A. BEPS 
In 2013, the OECD Finance Committee published a report containing 
its findings on base erosion and profit shifting and presented it to the 
G20.  The report found that base erosion and profit shifting occurred on 
two separate levels.54  The report describes the problem as “clearly a tax 
compliance aspect, as shown by a number of high profile cases,” but, 
“there is a more fundamental policy issue: the international, common 
principle drawn from national experiences to share tax jurisdiction may 
not have kept pace with the changing business environment.”55  Given 
this observation, the report establishes a basic principle upon which the 
rest of the BEPS discussion is built: “[C]urrent international tax 
standards may not have kept pace with changes in global business 
practices, in particular in the area of intangibles and the development of 
the digital economy.”56 
There are hidden implications to this basic principle that give insight 
into the way the OECD thinks about BEPS.  First, there is a strong 
emphasis on addressing transfer pricing, which is most rampant in the 
digital economy, as illustrated by the example in Part I.  Second, there is 
little forthright attention given to economies that do not have strong 
presences in intangible goods or the digital economy.  Third, as 
evidenced by the weak “may not have kept pace”57 language, those 
future propositions for reform will not be harsh or binding; rather, they 
will be deferential to leading nations with well-established tax policy. 
Based on this initial premise, the OECD outlined general goals for 
nations to work together to achieve: (i) simplification of tax 
administration;58 (ii) establishment of requirements for corporate 
documentation to aid in auditing;59 (iii) improved transparency between 
nations;60 and (iv) a holistic approach to tackling the global issue of 
http://www.oecd.org/about/membersandpartners/ (last visited Mar. 14, 2017). 
 54. ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., ADDRESSING BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING 
5 (Feb. 12, 2013), http://www.keepeek.com/Digital-Asset-Management/oecd/taxation/addressing-base-
erosion-and-profit-shifting_9789264192744-en#.WMhyWG_yvRY [hereinafter ADDRESSING BASE 
EROSION]. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 7. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. (“Simplification should also ensure that tax administrations have access to better tools for 
assessing tax compliance risks.”). 
 59. Id. (“This involves the development of documentation requirements able to provide tax 
auditors with the full picture of business operations.”). 
 60. ADDRESSING BASE EROSION, supra note 54, at 7 (“In the recent Past, the OECD also 
identified a number of avenues to better assess tax compliance risks, such as those described in Tackling 
Aggressive Tax Planning through Improved Transparency and Disclosure.”). 
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BEPS.61  The report, given to the G20 at their annual meeting in 2013, 
called the assembled world leaders to action by saying a 
“comprehensive approach, globally supported, should draw on an in-
depth analysis of the interaction of all these pressure points. It is clear 
that coordination will be key in the implementation of any solution, 
though countries may not all use the same instruments to address the 
issue of BEPS.”62 This call was followed by a caveat: “What is at stake 
is the integrity of the corporate income tax.  A lack of response would 
further undermine competition, as some business . . . may profit from 
BEPS opportunities . . . . In addition to issues of fairness, this may lead 
to an inefficient allocation of resources . . . .”63 Of ultimate importance, 
however, is the precedent that would be set if action were not taken by 
all of the most powerful nations: “[I]f other taxpayers think that 
multinational corporations can legally avoid paying income tax it will 
undermine voluntary compliance by all taxpayers—upon which modern 
tax administration depends.”64 
Based on this report, the OECD and the G20 formulated the Action 
Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, which was released later in 
2013.  This action plan consists of fifteen Action Points, all of which are 
scheduled for completion by December 2015.65  The points were 
designed for individual nations to separately research and address, with 
the understanding that findings and conclusions would be shared, as is 
expected of OECD members.66  The fifteen Action Points have been 
well-executed by many of the G20 and OECD nations, particularly those 
in the European Union.67  In June 2015, the EU presented its own 
unilateral action plan to address tax avoidance practices that were 
upheld by the OECD as being in line with the BEPS Action Plan.68  
This action plan is deserving of a closer look because it details the many 
considerations the EU made when attempting to curb BEPS and tax 
avoidance and, additionally, because the structure of the European 
market as a whole is an easily-studied microcosm of the global market. 
The EU’s structure offers unique challenges when addressing tax 
avoidance practices that are technically legal:  
 61. Id. (“Government actions should be comprehensive and deal with all of the different aspects 
of the issue. These include, for example, the balance between source and residence taxation, the tax 
treatment of intra-group financial transactions, the implementation of anti-abuse provisions, as well as 
transfer pricing rules.”). 
 62. Id. at 7-8. 
 63. Id. at 8. 
 64. Id. 
 65. ACTION PLAN, supra note 6, at 11. 
 66. Id. at 25. 
 67. Jack Bernstein, BEPS: The European Response So Far, 79 TAX NOTES INT’L 1111 (2015). 
 68. Id. 
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The pressure to lure multinationals with attractive tax regimes has 
stretched what is considered acceptable in tax competition.  The 
European Union is unique because it is a single market; it has 
treaties providing for the freedom of establishment, which must be 
respected; and it has the ability to introduce legislation.69 
 
In other words, the member nations of the EU, in order to entice 
multinational corporations to establish a presence in their nations, have 
frequently adjusted tax rates and requirements.  This practice has 
resulted in a race-to-the-bottom mentality.  However, that same inter-
connectedness presents an opportunity to enable more expedient reform 
because all nations have the same greater legislative body for economic 
matters.  The EU’s proposal has five primary goals, all of which 
correlate with the OECD’s Action Plan on BEPS and thus carry the 
OECD’s support: (i) create a common consolidated corporate-tax base 
that simplifies nation-to-nation tax interaction; (ii) ensure effective 
taxation where profits are generated, which is a primary part of the 
OECD’s plan and would greatly limit transfer pricing schemes; (iii) 
create a better tax environment for EU businesses through measures like 
cross-border loss offset and improvement of double-taxation dispute 
mechanisms; (iv) create further progress on taxation transparency, 
another common theme of OECD action; and (v) emphasize cooperation 
between EU member nations, as is also called for by the OECD.70 
While this is a separate action by a coalition of nations other than the 
OECD or G20, the measures proposed by the European Union’s 
Commission shows that BEPS and tax avoidance have gained 
international attention.  Moreover, real change is in the works, as 
research demonstrates the cognizable benefit to be had from the 
proposed changes. 
IV. IS BEPS NOT ENOUGH?  ICRICT’S BROADER, MORE AGGRESSIVE 
STANCE 
On June 2, 2015, the Independent Commission for the Reform of 
International Corporate Taxation issued a Declaration that claimed the 
OECD’s BEPS did not go far enough to address deeper issues.71  During 
 69. Id. 
 70. A Fair and Efficient Corporate Tax System in the European Union: 5 Key Areas for Action, 
EUR. PARL. DOC (COM 302) (2015). 
 71. See Evaluation of the Independent Commission for the Reform of International Corporate 
Taxation for the Base Erosion and Profit-Shifting Project of the G20 and OECD, INDEP. COMMISSION 
REFORM OF INT’L CORP. TAX’N 1 (Oct. 2015), http://www.icrict.org/wp-
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his inaugural speech, Chairman Jose Antonio Ocampo, former United 
Nations Under-Secretary General, claimed the process undertaken by 
the OECD is “undemocratic, limited in scope, and unable to provide 
adequate solutions for developing countries.”72  This section introduces 
ICRICT by telling its history, describing its makeup and primary 
figures, and finally presenting its goals for reform. 
The Commission seeks to occupy a different space in the tax-reform 
debate.  ICRICT calls itself “a group of leaders from government, 
academia, and civil society, including the faith community.”73  The 
group acknowledges its ubiquity, claiming that “our backgrounds, 
experience, and expertise span the globe.”74 
Organized and coalesced by non-government organizations (NGOs) 
and aid organizations such as Oxfam, the World Council of Churches, 
Action Aid, Christian Aid, the Global Alliance for Tax Justice, and 
others, ICRICT sees the current moment in history as ripe for more 
significant reform of the international-corporate-taxation system.75  In 
addition to Mr. Ocampo, ICRICT’s Committee consists of many well-
respected academics such as Nobel Prize-winner Joseph E. Stiglitz, as 
well as political figures such as Eva Joly of France and Manuel F. 
Montes of the United Nations Department of Economic and Social 
Affairs (UNDESA).76  Ocampo laments the esoteric nature of the 
debate, arguing, “Tax policy affects everyone, but so far the debate over 
global tax policy has been reserved for tax lawyers and accountants.  
There is a desperate need to bridge the gap between discussions on the 
technical challenges . . . and everyone’s right to participate in the debate 
and provide solutions.”77 
Toby Quantrill, the Principal Economic Justice Adviser at Christian 
Aid, illustrates one way ICRICT will differ from the OECD’s efforts in 
the BEPS initiative: “Although civil society organizations have agreed 
to work with the G-20 and the OECD on the BEPS initiative and with 
the U.N. on its Financing for Development agenda, ICRICT will provide 
an alternative platform to discuss systemic issues affecting developing 
content/uploads/2015/10/ICRICT_BEPS-Briefing_EN_web-version-1.pdf [hereinafter Evaluation]. 
 72. Margaret Burow, Independent Commission Seeks to Bridge Gap in BEPS Debate, 77 TAX 
NOTES INT’L 1053 (2015). 
 73. Declaration, INDEP. COMMISSION FOR THE REFORM OF INT’L CORP. TAX’N 1 (June 2015), 
http://www.icrict.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/ICRICT_Com-Rec-Report_ENG_v1.4.pdf 
[hereinafter Declaration]. 
 74. Id. 
 75. About ICRICT, INDEP. COMMISSION FOR THE REFORM OF INT’L CORP. TAX’N, 
http://www.icrict.org/about-us/ (last visited Mar. 14, 2017). 
 76. The Commission, INDEP. COMMISSION FOR THE REFORM OF INT’L CORP. TAX’N, 
http://www.icrict.org/the-commission/ (last visited Mar. 14, 2017). 
 77. Burow, supra note 72. 
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countries.”78  This is an important difference, as Christine Allen of 
Christian Aid describes in her blog: “[T]he perspective of countries 
[that] are poor and less powerful has to be influencing the debate for it 
to be worthwhile.  Hearing the perspective of the poor is long overdue, 
and a vital element to working for the common good—it cannot be right 
that only the rich define what this is.”79  In short, ICRICT aims to 
address the broader tax system framework, rather than the narrower 
focus of OECD’s BEPS initiative. 
Recommendations 1, 2, 3, and 5, while only a portion of the entire 
body of work, demonstrate the overall method that ICRICT advances.  
In its first recommendation, found in the organization’s original 
Declaration, ICRICT boldly claims, “States must reject the artifice that a 
corporation’s subsidiaries and branches are separate entities entitled to 
separate treatment under tax law, and instead recognize that 
multinational corporations act as single firms conducting business 
activities across international borders.”80  This should sound similar to 
the action plan against tax avoidance that the EU delivered in 2015, the 
second primary goal of which was to “ensure effective taxation where 
profits are generated.”81  However, ICRICT’s version pushes further 
than the OECD and the EU example because it is a stricter standard that 
eliminates the arm’s-length standard that the OECD and the vast 
majority of nations follow.  Instead, ICRICT calls for an alternative 
method of treating multinational corporations and their subsidiaries.  
This method is known as the “primary-purpose test” and “provides more 
legal authority for countries to evaluate the economic substance of 
income attribution and challenge the characterization of transactions that 
have the primary purpose of avoiding taxation.”82  While some aspects 
of the OECD’s BEPS Action Plan have the similar effect of giving 
nations more power to challenge the way corporations characterize 
income,83 the OECD always operates under the arm’s-length method 
that naturally gives more deference to corporations. 
The Declaration continues to recommend reform that heavily stresses 
equitable taxation for all nations and maximum transparency between 
 78. Id. 
 79. Christine Allen, The Case for a Global Tax System That Works for the Common Good, 
RESPONSIBLE TAX FOR COMMON GOOD (Apr. 27, 2015), 
http://www.responsibletax.org.uk/post/117524667851/the-case-for-a-global-tax-system-that-works-for. 
 80. Declaration, supra note 73, at 2. 
 81. A Fair and Efficient Corporate Tax System in the European Union: 5 Key Areas for Action, 
EUR. PARL. DOC (COM 302) (2015). 
 82. Evaluation, supra note 71, at 1. 
 83. E.g., Action 8 of OECD’s Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting: “Assure that 
transfer pricing outcomes are in line with value creation of intangibles,” which suggests, “Develop rules 
to prevent BEPS by moving intangibles among group members.” ACTION PLAN, supra note 6, at 20. 
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sovereigns regarding tax practices.  Recommendation 2 is titled Curb 
Tax Competition and is similar to the EU Commission’s 
recommendation referenced above.84  In this Recommendation, just as 
the EU Commission recommended in 2011,85 ICRICT suggests that the 
race-to-the-bottom can be halted by establishing an international-
uniform-corporate-tax rate.86  In addition, ICRICT calls on nations to 
more proactively disclose tax practices, incentives given to lure 
corporations, and exclusions provided to corporations.87  It also 
implores them to use this information to bring more legal actions to 
organizations like the EU Commission.88 
Recommendation 3 is a sharper divergence from the OECD’s BEPS 
plan.  Here, ICRICT calls on nations to strengthen enforcement of tax 
laws in several ways, including: (i) imposing criminal penalties on 
abusive tax practices; (ii) protecting whistleblowers with official 
provisions and legislation; (iii) funding and empowering tax 
administrators; and (iv) requiring multinational corporations to publish 
practices and adhere to universally adopted ethical principles.89  
ICRICT qualifies this, however, by reiterating that the international 
community must cooperate to produce coherent rules;90 if every nation 
were to create their own more stringent rules, multinationals would 
simply take advantage of differences as they do now with the more than 
3000 tax treaties that exist between nations.91 
ICRICT addresses the vast amount of intertwined tax treaties in 
Recommendation 5 of their initial Declaration.  Here, ICRICT suggests:  
 
(i) States should avoid restriction on tax withholding in tax 
treaties; (ii) Multilateral organizations should expand the 
objectives of model tax treaties to include preventing double non-
taxation . . . ;(iii) Multilateral organizations [such as the EU] 
should amend the model tax treaties to include a general anti-
avoidance rule; [and] (iv) States should avoid the inclusion of 
provisions in [various tax agreements] that weaken or circumvent 
 84. In fact, ICRICT includes the EUC’s common consolidated corporate-tax base as part of their 
second Recommendation. Declaration, supra note 73, at 3. 
 85. Commission Proposal for a Council Directive on a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax 
Base (CCCTB), SEC (2011) 316. 
 86. Declaration, supra note 73, at 3. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id.  This seems to be just what the European Commission did when it brought actions against 
Fiat Chrysler, Starbucks, Inc., and Apple, as discussed above in Part I. 
 89. Declaration, supra note 73, at 4. 
 90. Evaluation, supra note 71, at 4. 
 91. ADDRESSING BASE EROSION, supra note 54, at 8. 
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tax law.92 
 
This is similar to the OECD’s BEPS Action 6 on preventing treaty 
abuse, which calls on nations to develop new model treaties that would 
“prevent the granting of treaty benefits in inappropriate 
circumstances.”93  ICRICT, however, maintains that the OECD’s 
initiative does not go far enough on this matter.  In their review of the 
OECD’s action, ICRICT says that “the proposals for reform for the tax 
nexus rules could contain greater acknowledgement of digital activity 
and services, which permeate our knowledge- and service-based global 
economy and have become a major source of tax avoidance.”94 
A general theme is thus present throughout ICRICT’s 
Recommendations—the OECD’s plan is neither aggressive nor 
inclusive enough.  ICRICT has support from several sides in this belief.  
In one recent report, the Tax Justice Network (TJN)—in coalition with 
Oxfam International, the Global Alliance for Tax Justice, and Public 
Services International (PSI)—demonstrated that developing nations 
deserve more consideration than they currently receive in the 
international corporate-tax-reform conversation.95  TJN shows how 
economies in developing nations often rely more on corporate-tax 
revenue than do their G20 counterparts.96  While the G20 economies do 
endure the majority of the total dollar amount of tax avoidance, 
corporate tax accounts for a smaller share of G20 national revenue 
which offsets the effect of the higher amount lost.97  TJN’s main 
criticism thus matches ICRICT’s: Developing nations—the entities most 
affected by tax avoidance methods—are largely left out of the 
conversation on international-corporate-tax reform, which until now has 
resembled a G20 big-boys’ club of the global superpowers. 
In another article from October 2015, one analyst gave an in-depth 
analysis of the fifteen Action Points from the OECD to counter BEPS.98  
Throughout his analysis, Ramon Tomazela identified holes in the 
OECD’s Action Points that, when taken together, show that the BEPS 
plan is largely toothless and does not effect any real change of its own 
 92. Declaration, supra note 73, at 5. 
 93. ACTION PLAN, supra note 6, at 31. 
 94. Evaluation, supra note 71, at 3. 
 95. TAX JUSTICE NETWORK ET AL., STILL BROKEN: GOVERNMENTS MUST DO MORE TO FIX THE 
INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE TAX SYSTEM (Nov. 2015), 
https://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/file_attachments/bn-still-broken-corporate-tax-
101115-embargo-en.pdf. 
 96. Id. at 6. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Ramon Tomazela, A Critical Evaluation of the OECD’s BEPS Project, 79 TAX NOTES INT’L 
239 (2015). 
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because, “in practice, the success of the OECD measures largely 
depends on whether countries will embrace the outcomes of the BEPS 
action plans even against their national interest.”99  The implication, of 
course, is that no lasting change will happen as a result of the political 
quagmire in which the BEPS finds itself. 
V. ICRICT POSITIONED TO CREATE ACTUAL CHANGE 
ICRICT’s 2015 Evaluation for the Base Erosion and Profit-Shirting 
Project of the G20 and OECD ends with an acknowledgment that the 
tax-reform conversation is merely beginning and that any hope for long-
term success in curbing tax abuse will take multilateral cooperation and 
increased inclusion of public-interest groups:  
 
However, this is not the end-point, but just the beginning of a new 
and wider debate on global tax reform.  Our world has been 
changed by globalization.  The global economy has transformed 
since the last century when the old rules were made by the United 
States and Europe.  It’s time for smarter rules based on global 
negotiation and made in the public interest.  It’s time to go beyond 
BEPS.100 
 
The position that the biggest players should not dominate the reform 
conversation is the overarching theme of ICRICT’s reform 
recommendations.  ICRICT’s position that BEPS does not go far enough 
has also been shown to have support101—even if not in a formal, 
officially recognized sense—from objective observers and independent 
research.102  ICRICT, however, also faces an uphill battle in its path to 
sparking real change on its own account for many of the same reasons 
that detract from the OECD’s plan.  This seems entirely likely to doom 
ICRICT to a role that will keep it outside of the primary powers behind 
tax reform. 
Three initial criticisms emerge that ICRICT must take into account.  
First, how costly will their proposed methods of strengthening tax 
enforcement, increasing transparency, and treaty reformation be for the 
developing nations that ICRICT claims are its primary concern?  In 
many circumstances, it seems as though new infrastructure will be 
needed to begin to address the tax-abuse issues that the OECD and 
ICRICT want to address, which may simply not be feasible in 
 99. Id. 
 100. Evaluation, supra note 71, at 4. 
 101. See supra Part IV. 
 102. See TAX JUSTICE NETWORK ET AL., supra note 95. 
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economies that are still developing.  And yet, the need for reform 
certainly still exists, as developing nations are also the seat of much of 
the world’s early-stage production of goods.  Corporations are 
seemingly invited to abuse tax systems that allow for them to pay fewer 
taxes in countries where employees live and work in favor of declaring 
the work done in another country that has a more favorable tax rate.  
This transfer pricing scheme is just what ICRICT’s public-interest 
backers hope to change,  but this  type of scheme will need 
exponentially greater diligence and investment to transform in many 
developing nations around the world. 
Second, and possibly more importantly, any effectiveness of 
ICRICT’s recommendations depends largely on the political willingness 
of powerful nations to make drastic changes to the subjective motivation 
behind current policies.  Time and again, nations show that they are 
committed to maintaining and developing human rights, but when 
trillions of dollars’ worth of tax revenue is at stake, organizations like 
OECD seem opt to give great deference to established nations’ policies.  
This happens at the expense of developing nations, but there is little that 
can be done to ameliorate this problem without the official buy in of the 
members of the OECD and G20, as well as other nations around the 
world, that are in position to take advantage of less-powerful nations in 
order to gain more slices of the international-corporate-tax pie. 
Third, ICRICT does not have the official support of the international 
community or the reputation the OECD has built over decades.103  
Clearly, the ability to appear before the G20 or other official bodies and 
gain public support from influential nations is the ideal position for 
advocacy groups like ICRICT.  On the other hand, operating separately 
allows ICRICT to avoid the political concerns that seem to delay the 
OECD’s BEPS proceedings or soften proposed reform measures. 
Despite these challenges, however, the time to challenge the OECD 
or expand on its progress is now, as the program just received G20 
support for its final stages.104  But, even with the nominal support of the 
international community, there is plenty of indication that the OECD’s 
plan does little to cause change.  The nations that are taking action have 
been forced to take unilateral or independent actions that are either 
ahead of schedule or different from the rest.105  The result is that the 
 103. See The Coalition, INDEP. COMMISSION FOR THE REFORM OF INT’L. CORP. TAX’N, 
http://www.icrict.org/partner-organizations/ (last visited Feb. 14, 2017) (ICRICT’s “coalition,” which it 
calls the group of NGOs responsible for assembling the commission, lacks any official government or 
government body). 
 104. Stephanie Johnston, G-20 Endorses Final BEPS Package, 80 TAX NOTES INT’L 647 (2015). 
 105. See Mindy Herzfeld, News Analysis: U.K. Leads On while the U.S. Dithers, 80 TAX NOTES 
INT’L 727 (2015); see also Mindy Herzfeld, News Analysis: Will the United States Take Action on the 
BEPS Action Plan?, 79 TAX NOTES INT’L 817 (2015). 
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international-corporate-tax system of old that was hopelessly 
complicated and fractured by tax treaties is still hopelessly complicated 
by a combination of old tax treaties that remain due to political 
pushback against BEPS reform as well as ambitious reform movements 
by other nations.  In light of these developments, criticisms like 
ICRICT’s—that the OECD is not inclusive or aggressive enough—
undeniably strike home.  TJN’s conclusion, that “the measures recently 
announced by the OECD leave the fundamentals of a broken tax system 
intact and do not stop the race to the bottom in corporate taxation,”106 
gives an excellent final word to the current status of international-
corporate-tax reform. 
If ICRICT is to take off as a reform body, its own criticisms of BEPS 
must serve as an important reminder that ICRICT must always strive to 
be different and bolder than the OECD in order to thrive as a reform 
body.  If ICRICT is to succeed in becoming a catalyst for real change, it 
must maintain its identity as an organization devoted to shaping the 
future tax system rather than merely altering the current tax system. 
V. CONCLUSION 
There is no doubt that tax avoidance in the form of base erosion and 
profit shifting is a real problem that every nation faces.  Thus far, 
however, the international community has hamstrung itself against 
meaningful, lasting change by following the OECD’s BEPS program as 
a solution to these problems.  ICRICT stands apart as a group with an 
aggressive plan that requires complete cooperation from every single 
nation, with no exceptions.  This insistence, if firmly maintained, gives 
ICRICT the opportunity to create the real change that the OECD could 
not quite muster. 
  
 106. TAX JUSTICE NETWORK ET AL., supra note 95, at 1. 
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